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EMBRACING THE ILL-STRUCTURED
PROBLEM IN A COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT CLINIC
'SUSA4 DW BF NNE'TTV'
This article describes the form, or formlessness, of a typical com-
munity development project that a law school clinic might take on for
a community group; how the project resembles that described in the
literature on problem-solving as the "ISP" - the "ill-structured" or
"complex" problem; and how law students, the archetypal novice
problem-solvers, face particularly high hurdles in attempting to nego-
tiate this particularly intimidating kind of case. With their fluidity of
variables and indeterminancy of path and result, community develop-
ment projects are quintessential "ISPs."
The article asks whether the solving of complex problems can be
taught as a learning strategy, or if learners can only expand this ex-
pertise through time and experience. For experts, the most important
activities within the process of complex problem-solving are those
that occur at the very beginning: those involved in defining the prob-
lem, or in "problem-finding." These are steps that novices often pre-
sume to be obvious, rush through, or simply overlook. The article
suggests that teachers focus on assisting their students (and on assist-
ing their students to assist their clients) in taking great care with these
first steps.
In the context of community development, where neighborhood-
based groups choose their projects to address the systemic bases of
poverty, the process of problem definition is inherently political. The
article addresses the significance of the "causal story," the hypothesis
about what the problem is, how it began, and inferentially how to
solve it. Control over the fortunes of the neighborhood will rest in the
hands of whoever gets to dictate the terms of the "causal story. " The
article contends that how to combat the received wisdom of the causal
story is a teachable, and indispensable skill.
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CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
AND THE DAYS GROW SHORT, WHEN YOU REACH SEPTEMBER...1
(AN INTRODUCTION)
The scene is September, an office interior. The fly on the wall
sees Sam and Stella, deeply focused on their computer monitors.
They are representing a neiglborhood group. The group did not
form organically, though some ofits members have known and lived
near each other for years; it was convened by the city's planning de-
partment in an attempt to capture a federal grant. The purpose of the
grant is to revitalize urban neighborhoods through support of small
businesses. In order to be competitive, the grant application had to
present what would qualify as a "severely distressed" community; in
response, the planning department described this neighborhood, accu-
rately, as without branches of libraries or banks, without sit-down res-
taurants, retail stores, or a community center. The application also
had to demonstrate consultation and partnership with a neighborhood
advisory board; in response, the planning department picked the
group. After the grant was awarded, the planning department con-
tacted this law clinic to incorporate the group and secure federal and
local tax exempt status for it, both pre-conditions to drawing money
down from the grant.
Sam and Stella are clinical law students, and this is their first
case.2 They hunker down to the IRS website (on line) and the state
nonprofit corporations code (also on line) and dig into drafting arti-
cles of incorporation and pulling up the IRS's form for applying for
tax exemption.
The fly moves on in search of something more interesting.
The scene is February, an office interior. The fly on the wall sees
Sam and Stella, deep in discussion. They are brainstorming about
whom to invite to a meeting that their client group has asked them to
help organize, to investigate ways to set up an "incubator" program to
advise and fund home daycare providers. Sam and Stella contacted
the SBA's Small Business Development Center downtown, the city
council member's office, the state and federal agencies that provide
funds for daycare, and the three local agencies that license daycare
providers. Representatives from all these offices agreed to attend, to
describe what assistance might be available. Now Sam and Stella are
discussing their report to the client board on the possible cast of char-
acters, and how to advise the board on the most productive structure
I MAXWELL ANDERSON & KURT WEILL, SEPTEMBER SONG (1938).
2 The usual caveats about the "Sam(s)" and "Stella(s)" of this genre of writing apply:
These are fictional names and situations, abstracted from a number of experiences with
students and neighborhood-based organizational clients in a community development law
school clinic over the course of several years.
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for this meeting.
The space between September and February marks more than
the passage of time. Between September and February Sam and
Stella met seventeen times with their client, at night in a kindergarten
classroom. By the seventeenth meeting eight of the original thirteen
members of the group had been replaced by others. Sam and Stella
had walked the neighborhood in the morning and after dark, alone
and in the company of different members of the group. They had
eaten at the KFC and had accepted an invitation to introduce them-
selves to the congregation at the AME church. They talked to the
principals and PTA presidents of the elementary and middle schools.
About a month into their relationship with the members of their
board, they learned how little the members knew about the purpose
or administration of the grant, and how superficially they had been
consulted about the neighborhood's needs.
After many discussions, the board members decided to canvass
their neighbors to get a sense of their priorities. They set up commit-
tees to draft a questionnaire and to administer it, door to door. They
found that daycare was a significant need that the original grant had
ignored, that several women were already earning extra cash by baby-
sitting for many children in their homes, and that none of these tem-
porary arrangements was accessible to disabled children or met basic
safety standards. The meeting which Sam and Stella helped convene
in February resulted from not only the board members' conviction of
the importance of child care, but also from Sam's and Stella's re-
search, which persuaded them that they could make a case for inter-
preting the purpose of the grant to meet their client's needs. The
processes of organizing to interview their neighbors and of reconcep-
tualizing the goals of the grant encouraged the board members to
think of themselves as a formal group that spoke for their neighbor-
hood. They directed Sam and Stella to draft by-laws for them, to set
conditions of membership and sketch out a mission statement.
Sam and Stella have done several different things in these five or
so months. They have re-defined a "problem space;" they have bro-
ken apart the "well-structured" problem they were given into an "ill-
structured" one; and they have re-configured that ill-structured prob-
lem into a well-structured one.3 To chart their progress is to illustrate
how novice lawyers approach problem definition - if they are lucky.
As we know, novices process information differently from more ex-
perienced practitioners - both because they have less of their own
3 For a discussion of "problem spaces" and the distinction between "well" and "ill-
structured" problems, see infra Section I.A.
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experience to process and because they process what little they have
less efficiently and at the same time, less expansively.4
But even experienced practitioners encounter difficulties when
they represent community groups in community development
projects. It is in the very nature of community development projects
to be "complex" or "ill-structured*" Only rarely are there defining
structures of the sort one might find in planning strategy for, say, a
housing eviction defense or a custody case: the rules and timetables of
a particular tribunal, the substantive and procedural rules for an ascer-
tainable body of law. Rather, "the law" may be many laws - the
private contractual law of real estate transactions, the federal regula-
tory law of housing development programs, or the local statutory law
of zoning. There may be no tribunal at all; actors talk about "partner-
ships," not adversaries. 5
That there are no obvious battle lines does not mean that there
are no issues about power. Within every deal that a neighborhood-
based organization makes with an agency, a business or another non-
profit group, there are questions about who gets to control the agenda
- and, most important for our purposes, who gets to dictate the terms
of the problem. The creator of the "causal story," the hypothesis
about what the problem is, how it began, and inferentially how to
solve it, holds enough power to turn any problem-solving relationship
from a collaboration into a struggle for control. Seen from this per-
spective, "problem-solving" evolves from the procedural to the
4 See, e.g., Joachim Funke, Solving Complex Problems: Exploration and Control of
Complex Systems, in COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 185, 210
(Robert J. Sternberg & Peter A. Frensch eds., 1991) (noting experts' greater facility in
generating hypotheses from data and analyzing relationships among variables). For a fuller
discussion of the differences in ways that expert and novice problem solvers tackle "ill-
structured" problems, see infra Section I.B.
5 For an overview of the political and economic issues underlying the reliance on alli-
ances between governmental and private sector actors to stimulate development in dis-
tressed cities, see Max 0. Stephenson, Jr., Whither the Public-Private Partnership: A
Critical Overview, 27 URB. AFFAIRS QTRLY 109 (1991). For a recent example among many
in which funding sources predicate participation in their programs upon the collaboration
of different community actors in "partnership," see Super Notice of Funding Availability
for HUD's Discretionary Grant Programs for Fiscal Year 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 13,925, 13,930
(March 26, 2002) (requiring applicants for grants from the Office of University Partner-
ships to show collaboration among university departments, local governments, neighbor-
hood groups and community institutions in designing programs of direct benefit to
distressed communities). See also Harry J. Wexler, HOPE VI: Market Means/Public Ends
- The Goals, Strategies and Midterm Lessons of HUD's Urban Revitalization Demonstra-
tion Program, 10 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 195,213-216
(2001) (describing how the necessity of developing social service programs and leveraging
federal funds to satisfy the goals of the public housing HOPE VI program has prompted
public housing authorities to form partnerships with social service providers and private
developers).
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political.
Finally, in a community development practice, the client itself
may be "complex" or "ill-structured" - a corporate group or an in-
formal association, where the elected officers may be nominally ac-
countable to a membership, or only to some principle. Sometimes the
lawyer may look confidently to the elected officers and directors of an
organization for guidance; sometimes the instability of the organiza-
tion may leave the lawyer with no clear idea of who is in charge, or
whose point of view the spokesperson represents.
In this free-floating world, our Sams and Stellas face more than
the usual challenges to their sense of competence as young lawyers.
They must contend not only with the basics of how to function in a law
office and take responsibility for a client's welfare, but with identify-
ing the fora, the actors, and sometimes even the client itself.6 With all
these variables in a community development practice, "problem solv-
ing" becomes inevitably "complex." The recognition that a problem is
"complex" involves a process that of itself invokes several skills, the
most critical of them being the definition of the problem and its imme-
diate "operators" or tools towards resolution, all summed up as the
creation of "the problem space. ' 7 Creating problem spaces requires
development not only of cognitive skills, but of political sensitivity, an
ability to challenge the preconceptions of more powerful actors in sit-
uations just as intimidating to novices as standing up to a judge would
be. The purpose of this paper is to examine how - or whether - we
can shorten the distance between September and February for clinical
students (and their clients who wait for them to get up to speed) by
assisting them in mastering these most difficult predicate skills.
I. "ILL-STRUCTURED" PROBLEMS, WELL-SEASONED
PROBLEM-SOLVERS
A. The"Ill-Structured" Problem and the Construction of the
Wide-Open Problem Space
The many characterizations of "ill-structured" or "complex"
problems coalesce around some common points. Ill-structured
problems present unclear, often multiple goals,8 and often demand
6 For a thoughtful commentary on the challenges which clinic students face when they
must encounter ill-structured problems and "take responsibility for shaping the problem
situations as well as proposing persuasive solutions," see Mark N. Aaronson, We Ask You
to Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L.REv. 247, 305
(1998).
7 Many researchers use the phrase "problem space;" for further discussion of the term,
and of others (such as "operators") associated with the model of problem solving, see infra
Section I.A.
8 See, e.g., Jan D. Sinnott, A Model for Solution of Ill-Structured Problems: Implica-
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generation of multiple solutions.9 Such problems suffer from "open
constraints," an absence of obvious parameters or variables, where
some of the initial and developing features of the problem may be
invisible to the problem-solver. To cite an example, when a composer
faces the task of composing a fugue, the only "closed constraints"
which inform her work are the -fugue form. itself and the conventions
- perhaps - of tonality.10 In a complex problem, these constraints
erupt, intrude, and vanish frequently, and effect changes in each
other. As a result of the fluidity of variables in a complex problem,
any action one takes towards resolution may have long-delayed, un-
predictable outcomes.1 The activity of lawyering itself, with its inde-
terminacy, uncertainty of result, and mutability of multiple variables
has been described as an "ill-structured problem."'1 2 In contrast,
"well-structured problems" immediately present the problem solver
with all the obvious elements for resolution: a stable environment, de-
sirable outcomes, and a predictable relationship between outcomes
and the actions necessary to achieve them.' 3
Herbert Simon and others concur in their observation that most
of the effort which problem solvers direct at solving problems actually
goes towards structuring problems.1 4 The term "problem space"'15 re-
fers to the cognitive framework within which problem solvers "invent"
a problem (described in one source as "the recognition of a gap be-
tions for Everyday and Abstract Problem Solving, in EVERYDAY PROBLEM-SOLVING: THE-
ORY AND APPLICATIONS 72 (Jan D. Sinnott ed., 1989).
9 Id. at 87.
10 See Herbert A. Simon, The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems, 4 ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
LIGENCE 181, 189 (1973) (citing W.R.REITMAN, COGNITION AND THOUGHT 169 (1965) for
the example of the composer and the fugue).
11 Joachim Funke, Solving Complex Problems: Exploration and Control of Complex
Systems, in COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 186 (Robert J.
Sternberg & Peter A. Frensch eds., 1991).
12 See Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature: Instinct and Automaticity in Le-
gal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
13 Karen Strohm Kitchener & Helene G. Brenner, Wisdom and Reflective Judgment:
Knowing in the Face of Uncertainty, in WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
212, 213 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1990).
14 See Simon, supra note 10, at 187 ("There is merit to the claim that much problem
solving effort is directed at structuring problems, and only a fraction of it in solving
problems once they are structured"); James F. Voss & Timothy A. Post, On the Solving of
Ill-Structured Problems, in THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE 261, 262 (Michelene T.H.Chi, Rob-
ert Glaser, & Marshall J. Farr eds., 1988).
15 For the use of the term "problem space" in a classic text, see ALLEN NEWELL AND
HERBERT A. SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 59 (1972). For a summary of a definition
of "problem space" as composed of "initial" and "goal" states and "operators," see Gary
L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Science, and the Functions of Theory,
45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 333 (1995) (citing Keith J. Holyoak, Problem Solving, in THINK-
ING: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 118 (Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith
eds., 1991)).
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tween the present state of affairs and some desired goal state"),16
identify the internal and external resources or "operators" 17 available
to resolve it, and collect and sift information. This metaphor of mind
as "IPS," or "information processing system," 18 with nomenclature
and functions drawn from computer science, dominates the way in
which cognitive psychologists approach, the analysis of problem
solving.1 9
Simon has depicted the "immediate problem space" for an ill-
structured problem graphically, in the form of a loop. A set of initial
goals, limits or "constraints" and specifications to those goals rests
within the loop of the "immediate problem space," and awaits the in-
flux of new and old information.20 From outside the loop, the prob-
lem solver retrieves new information from external sources, and
evokes buried knowledge from long-term memory. The process is
loopy, but linear. While the constant in-flow of information subjects
the problem space to constant modification, in keeping with the con-
ceptualization of the problem solver as "IPS" each draw-down of in-
formation, each corresponding shift in strategy occurs in sequence, in
what Simon describes as the "basically serial character" of problem
solving. 21 Problem solvers may cycle back to the same steps over and
over - defining the initial problem and goal, searching for informa-
tion, re-defining the problem, choosing and testing strategies, re-de-
signing solutions, re-defining the problem - but each of these steps
will occur one at a time. With ill-structured problems, that process
comes to a halt only once the problem solver decides that it does.
Subjectivity of result virtually defines the circumstances of the ill-
structured problem, for which no two problem-solvers may agree on
which are the open and which are the closed "constraints," and there-
fore may be unable to agree on any ensuing solution.22 Ill-structured
problems are solved via the "application of stop rules" - when the
problem solver decides that she has amassed enough information to
reach her goal.23 The complex problem literally is over when the fat
16 KEITH HOLYOAK & PAUL THAGARD, MENTAL LEAPS: ANALOGY IN CREATIVE
THOUGHT 63 (1995) (describing the most basic processes of problem creation and defini-
tion in primates).
17 See WAYNE W. REEVES, COGNITION AND COMPLEXITY: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF
MANAGING COMPLEXITY 42 (1996) (defining "operators" as strategies for problem solving,
a term derived from software programs with "known solution sets").
18 See Newell and Simon, supra note 15, at 85 (defining a human problem solver as an
"IPS," or "information processing system").
19 Reeves, supra note 17, at 42.
20 Simon, supra note 10, at 192, Figure 1.
21 Simon, supra note 10, at 192.
22 Voss & Post, supra note 14, at 263.
23 Voss & Post, supra note 14, at 281.
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lady sings.
That "human problem solvers," however experienced, can per-
form only one procedure in the problem solving process at a time
makes bewilderment easy, and puts a premium on efficient mecha-
nisms for admitting new stimuli into the problem space. "Schema the-
ory" offers an explanation for how problem solvers work through this
limitation. All learners file information in "schemata," storage struc-
tures of existing information with "slots" into which new information
is channeled and from which it can be retrieved. 24 The existence of
schemata enables the problem solver to connect new to old informa-
tion, and to create "scripts," a series of schemata in sequence, that will
allow her to compare elements of resolved problem spaces with what
currently confronts her. 25 The process of creating and applying analo-
gies is closely related to, and perhaps a part of, how problem solvers
use schemata. Construction of an analogy entails the "selection" of a
''source analog" from the thinker's memory (the stored item in a
schema), the "mapping" of the source analog to the "target," (associa-
tion of the stored item with the new item,) an "evaluation" of the
inferences about the target that the analogy raises, and "learning,"an
assessment of the success of the analogy.26 Without schemata, the ap-
proach to every new problem requires a re-invention, particularly
when the problem solvers are new not only to a particular field, but
(as our students may be) to the cognitive task of learning how to learn
about a particular field.27
Ill-structured problems morph. At different points along the con-
tinuum of structuring and resolution, ill-structured problems may turn
into well-structured problems, and back again. 28 Or, rather than say
that ill-structured problems morph, it might be more accurate to note
that problem solvers take ill-structured problems and morph them.
Researchers have used different metaphors to describe this process of
morphing: that of "decomposing,"or breaking down of unwieldy
24 Reeves, supra note 17, at 47.
25 See Blasi, supra note 15, at 336-37, for a description of "schema theory" in cognitive
science. Gerald Lopez describes the bank of information invoked to sort and categorize
incoming information, as a "stock structure." Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA
L.REV. 1, 16 (1984). For a discussion of what Lopez refers to as "stock stories," the politi-
cal scripts which problem solvers generate out of their "stock structures" or schemata, and
which are described elsewhere as "causal stories," see infra Section I.D..
26 See Holyoak & Thagard, supra note 16, at 15 (describing the process of drawing
analogies).
27 See Sharon J. Derry & Debra A. Murphy, Designing Systems That Train Learning
Ability: From Theory to Practice, 56 REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 1, 10 (1986) (suggesting
that "immature learners" lack "schema knowledge," the ability to identify what is impor-
tant to be learned).
28 Voss & Post, supra note 14, at 261.
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problems into manageable ones;29 or of constructing a sequence of
sub-goals 30 or of separate problem spaces; 31 or, without reliance on
metaphor, of "defining a solvable problem." 32 Whatever the meta-
phor, under a cognitive model problem solvers re-conceptualize ill-
structured problems into well-structured ones, with achievable sub-
tasks and knowable variables, so that they can solve the more fluid
problem one piece at a time. 33
B. The Well-Seasoned Problem-Solver
As Simon has pointed out, in the real world outside simulations
and experiments, virtually every problem presents itself as an "ill-
structured problem" or "ISP;" it is the problem solver who, in making
the problem "solvable," transforms it into a "well-structured prob-
lem" or "WSP." Or, to push the point further: "It is not exaggerating
much to say that there are no WSPs, only ISPs that have been formal-
ized for problem solvers."'34 Thus, the transition from "ISP" to
"WSP" is in the eye - or within the cognitive capabilities - of the
problem solver. The perception of the problem space depends di-
rectly on everything that the problem-solver brings to the enterprise:
personality, which affects the problem solver's ability to put mecha-
nisms of information sorting, storing and retrieval into play;35 the abil-
ity to distinguish between past relevant and irrelevant experience and
to retrieve what matters; and the capacity to draw from sources be-
29 See Robert Glaser & Michelene T.H. Chi, Overview, in THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE,
supra note 14, at xxv (on how experts "decompose" ill-structured problems into series of
well-structured ones); Simon, supra note 10, at 190 (on how, as an architect conceptualizes
the ambiguous meta-task of designing a house, the design "begins to acquire structure by
being decomposed into various problems of component design.").
30 Simon, supra note 10 at 190 (referring to the creation of a "system of sub-routine
calls").
31 See Sinnott, supra note 8, at 85.
32 RONALD TOSELAND & ROBERT RIVAS, INTRODUCTION TO GROUP WORK PRACTICE
133 (1984).
33 Although Simon's view seems to predominate the literature that I have read on the
cognitive model of problem solving, not all researchers agree that problem solvers will
draw on basically the same repertories of strategies, perhaps with different sequences and
facility, to fashion small problems from large. Phillip Karl Wood summarizes literature on
"inquiring systems," cognitive processes which react differently to problems of different
degrees of structuredness, and trigger within the problem solver different ways of modeling
the problem, the solution(s) and the means of implementing the solution. Phillip Karl
Wood, Inquiring Systems and Problem Structure: Implications for Cognitive Development,
26 HUM. DEV. 249, 254 (1983). Expert problem solvers are those who have expanded their
repertoire of "inquiring systems" to enable them to respond to different types of problems.
Id. at 263.
34 Simon, supra note 10, at 186.
35 See Derry & Murphy, supra note 27, at 7 (noting that traits such as impulsiveness
may impede the development of helpful processing tools such as reflection).
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yond personal experience. 36
All problem solvers re-fashion complex problems into digestible
chunks, but experts and novices do so differently. Novices have been
described as working backwards from what they perceive as the de-
sired "goal state" of their problem, to structure a series of "sub-
goals."'37 Though their trajectory may be backward, their reasoning is
linear: at first novices absorb information in series and unselectively,
but then are quick to infer connections from the limited information
that they have; and they may exclude information in order to reach
hypotheses for solutions consistent with their limited, manageable
bank of information. 38 Their lack of experience means that they have
fewer schemata (or, to adopt an "information-processing" metaphor,
less information to fill the slots of their schemata) from which to ab-
stract patterns of connection that they can apply to new situations. As
novices learn, they become more adept at drawing upon their stock of
experience and constructing schemata; indeed, the transformation
from novice to expert has been described as marked by the increased
"accessibility" of the schemata to the problem solver.39
Expert problem solvers move through information more assur-
edly but less in lock step, buoyed by the schemata that enable them to
select what past experience tells them will more likely than not be
applicable to the new problem. This confidence allows them to ac-
knowledge the subjectivity of the choice of problem space - there
may be no one correct configuration for a problem and there probably
36 For a summary of the difference between acting from "induction," or the ability to
cull and extrapolate from pertinent personal experience, and acting from "analogy," or the
ability to apply dissimilar, external experience, see Blasi, supra note 15, at 355. For a
description of a similar distinction between "domain-specific" (requiring the ability to re-
peat a problem-solving performance within one system) and "domain-general" (requiring
the ability to transfer problem-solving experience from one setting to another) learning,
see Funke, supra note 11, at 208.
37 See Blasi, supra note 15, at 345; Mary Bryson, Carl Bereiter, Marlene Scardamalia &
Elana Joram, Going Beyond the Problem as Given: Problem-Solving in Expert and Novice
Writers, in COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS, supra note 11, at
61-62.
38 See Funke, supra note 11, at 209 (noting that when expert and novice international
development aid workers were given the task of designing a hypothetical program for im-
proving living conditions in an impoverished third world community, novices more likely
to leap to conclusions and infer causal relationships from limited data); Eric J. Johnson,
Expertise and Decision Under Uncertainty: Performance and Process, in THE NATURE OF
EXPERTISE, supra note 14, at 209, 217 (observing that novice readers of files of applicants
for internships reviewed the files sequentially, taking in the information in the order
presented); Jeanette A. Lawrence, Expertise on the Bench: Modeling Magistrates' Judicial
Decision-Making, in THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE, supra note 14, at 229, 244-47 (remarking
that expert magistrates judging minor offenses were more likely to use and search for more
information and to explore more possibilities in sentencing than a novice magistrate, who
limited his concerns to keeping sentences consistent with the norms of the court).
39 Holyoak & Thagard, supra note 16, at 137.
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will be no one correct solution - and select the space that allows for
the greatest inclusion of the most variables at a given moment.40
Some of this ability comes from experience, some from basic personal
equanimity or at least the confidence born of experience. People who
excel at solving complex problems can cope comfortably with great
uncertainty at the beginning, long enough to tread water while they
sort out the patterns that enable them to sculpt out the known from
the unfamiliar. 41
As one might expect, there is no one formula for the expert ap-
proach to the solving of complex or ill-structured problems. A couple
of portraits of archetypal expert problem solvers at work suggest vari-
ations in how and when they use schemata to expand or contract the
problem space. Herbert Simon describes how an experienced archi-
tect might attack the assignment to design a house, a problem which is
"complex" because it begins with few closed external constraints (per-
haps no more than those supplied by the owners of the house such as
cost, and number and type of rooms.) In this scenario, the expert ac-
tually works backwards and forwards from and to the goal, calling up
from memory a schema, or "executive program" for the design pro-
cess that will remind her of what other constraints might define the
project (the size of the lot, the number of floors, the choice of materi-
als, the applicability of building codes) and will require the evaluation
of new information. The new information may change the initial view
of the project, and will elicit new schemata for the next steps. Here
the expert's sequenced application of schemata turns the "ISP" into a
succession of linked "WSPs," or sub-goals; as Simon notes, ". . .the
problem is well-structured in the small, but ill-structured in the
large. ' 42 While this "sub-goaling" may also be typical of the novice's
approach, the expert's access to schemata enables her to move cycli-
cally as well as linearly, from sub-goal to sub-goal to modifying the
initial goal to generating new sub-goals, if information gleaned in the
course of the intermediate steps warrants alteration.
This differs from another model presented to illustrate the expert
problem solver at work: that of the experienced writer. For writers,
the roles of the novice and experienced problem solvers are reversed:
studies of the novice writer show that she breezes through the assign-
ment, moving forward with scarcely a sideways or backwards glance,
while the expert agonizes, rejecting solutions and throwing up obsta-
cles.43 The reason for the difference is that the expert writer ap-
40 Sinnott, supra note 8, at 85.
41 Funke, supra note 11, at 205-6.
42 For the example of the architect as expert problem solver, see id. at 189-90.
43 See Bryson, et al., supra note 37, at 63-64 (contrasting the experiences of expert and
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proaches her task as the ultimate ill-structured problem, one that
begins with no articulation of any problem at all. The process of the
expert writer is an almost endlessly circular one of re-defining a goal,
one akin to that of representational artists who spend much of their
"problem-solving" time in "problem-finding," choosing and manipu-
lating media, and constructing preliminary models."a Unlike novice
writers, expert writers plan and re-plan throughout the course of writ-
ing, as what they create drives them in unexpected directions. Their
experience manifests itself not in schemata, but in increased expecta-
tion of ". .originality, coherence and interestingness. '4 5
Researchers have noted that experts do not necessarily traverse
the problem space more efficiently, or always arrive at results more
satisfactorily, than do novice problem solvers. This paradoxical result
arises from rigidities in experts' thinking, when they succeed too well
at what they are good at: namely, retrieving relevant information out
of memory and imposing the schemata they have retrieved upon their
choice of factors to consider in modifying the problem space.46 So
experienced lawyers may constrict all their data into enabling them to
evaluate clients' cases "bivalently" as "negligent/non-negligent" or
"guilty/not guilty," or as permitting or excluding a limited range of
well-trodden defenses.4 7 In this sense, both experts and novices
novice writers). Many writers have described the tortures of writing. Philip Roth has done
so through his alter ego, Nathan Zuckerman, who relates what his object of veneration, the
novelist E.I. Lonoff, tells him about his processes of creation: "I turn sentences around.
That's my life. I write a sentence and then I turn it around. Then I look at it and I turn it
around again. Then I have lunch. Then I come back in and write another sentence. Then I
have tea and turn the new sentence around. Then I read the two sentences over and turn
them both around. Then I lie down on my sofa and think. Then I get up and throw them
out and start from the beginning. And if I knock off from this routine for as long a day,
I'm frantic with boredom and a sense of waste." PHILIP ROTH, THE GHOST WRITER 17-18
(1979). Where necessity leaves off, and self indulgence begins, we tend to admit only to
ourselves.
44 Bryson et al., supra note 37, at 80; see also Patricia Kennedy Arlin, Wisdom: The Art
of Problem Finding, in WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS, AND DEVELOPMENT 230, 235-6
(Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1990) (citing J.W.GETZELS & M.CSIKZENTMIHALYI, THE CREA-
TIVE VISION: PROBLEM FINDING IN ART (1976) in which the authors describe their study of
how art students chose and arranged their subjects for still-life drawing).
45 Bryson et al., supra note 37, at 61.
46 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 38, at 217 (noting that experts evaluating applications
of medical school students for internships tend to overlook information considered irrele-
vant to their previous experience with medical school curricula and past applications, not
always with the most efficacious results); Blasi, supra note 15, at 346-47.
47 See David Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A Borrowed Paradigm for Crisper Lawyering, 4
CLINICAL L. REV.163, 182 (1997) (describing the phenomenon of "bivalent" or "either/or"
thinking among attorneys); see also GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAwYERING: ONE
CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 103-109 (pb.ed. 1992) (transcript of
fictional interview between a client who withheld rent to make repairs and received a three
day notice to quit, and a prototypical housing lawyer in a non-profit neighborhood law
office; as the lawyer notes before the client comes in, "Once you've done enough of these
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"skip" what could turn out to be useful information, but do so for
different reasons. Experts risk prematurely narrowing their field of
vision because their building up of and reliance upon schemata has
served them too well; novices arbitrarily exclude information because
they lack the schemata that would enable them to achieve a degree of
comfort with acknowledging and sorting through daunting masses of
data. In either case, the result is a premature transformation of the
"ISP" into the "WSP" or series of "WSPs."
So there are novices, experts, and experts whose unconscious re-
version to the tried and true makes them approach complex problems
more as do novices. The differences between experts and novices in
addressing ill-structured, or unstructured, problems seem to lend
themselves to being summarized in the differences between those
terms, "morphing" and "decomposing." "Decomposition" implies a
one-way, irreversible process of disintegration, the kind of linear
processing of information backwards from a defined goal, and sequen-
tial narrowing of the problem space, in which novices and sometimes
burned-out experts engage. "Morphing," as I mean to use it, with its
evocation of shape-shifting and re-shifting, seems to come closer to
what experts do when they are able to maintain the permeability of
the problem space. Not only are they comfortable with re-designing
plans in response to changing circumstances, but they are comfortable
with admitting the changing circumstances into the problem space to
begin with. Expert problem solvers, like expert writers, can distin-
guish between when it is important to tolerate uncertainty, be sensi-
tive to ambient information, and reject easy analogies to past
problem-solving experiences; and when it is safe to rely on the sche-
mata that have served them well, to pass over certain data and thus
dismiss certain possibilities. In short, they have developed the judg-
ment to know how long to suspend the rush to closure and leave the
messy problem "unstructured."
II. SAM'S AND STELLA'S CASE, WIDE-OPEN PROBLEM SPACES,
AND THE TEACHING OF EQUANIMITY
Sam and Stella had no experience to draw on save what they
brought from their personal lives and from their incipient training in
legal research and writing. Virtually by hit or miss, they succeeded in
things, you can get everything you need pretty fast. Kind of filling in the blanks.") Id. at
104. Brest and Krieger also comment on how experienced lawyers may miss nuances of
fact as a result of assumptions they make about the analogies between their instant client's
case and stock facts stored in schemata. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as
Problem Solvers, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 811, 824 (1999).
Fall 2002]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
re-conceptualizing the problem. First they transcended the set form of
the problem that was given to them, exploding the narrowest possible
problem space (the drafting of basic documents) into the broadest
possible one (the representation of the neighborhood's true interests
and perceived needs.) Then they split that space up among several
complex sub-problems (assessing the needs; defining and stabilizing
the client group;) and from those generated some well-structured
problems (re-defining the need as home-based day care and setting up
a meeting to get more information about how to encourage it; writing
by-laws to clarify the structure of the group and to articulate its mis-
sion.) They did better than "decompose;" they "morphed."
As noted earlier, Sam and Stella are composites. They are also a
fantasy - as are their clients, and is their case: not in that the situa-
tion could never present itself in this way (it does, and has),48 and not
in that the client group could never re-constitute itself by half (that
happens, too) but in that this scenario could resolve itself to this point,
this quickly. This is a time-lapse video, in part because it seems un-
likely that any brand new client group could maintain itself, in how-
ever fractured a form, and reach consensus on a startlingly new set of
goals and intermediate steps in a few months; or that it could do so at
least in part through engagement in a brand new relationship with two
brand new lawyers. That the lawyers are novice lawyers and possibly
novice problem-solvers makes it hard to see how, in turn, within a few
months they could feel enough at ease with the group and their role in
advising it to assist in formulating a new, defiant mission and a long
series of steps to confirm its validity and then to implement it.
But in some ways this was a speed in slowness. The admirable,
and most unlikely, skill which these novices demonstrated, was that of
stalling one set of demands, making a project imposed by outsiders
stand still while they worked with the possibility that a wholly unac-
knowledged project was resting in its matrix and capable of extraction
and definition. The "morphing" that they accomplished could only
begin once they could dare to question the initial definition of the
problem state. The question is whether this daring, and the framing of
the situation that enables it to occur, can be nurtured, and whether the
tools that enable students to feel more comfortable in embracing ill-
structured problems can be supplied.
A. Community Development Cases as Ill-Struciured Problems
The way in which Sam and Stella inadvertently approached their
48 See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 5, at 216-18 (describing the complexities of the "com-
munity-building" model encouraged by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment in the implementation of its HOPE VI program).
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client's problem - fluidly enlarging and constricting the problem
space, accepting the subjectivity of definition and of acceptable goal
or result - exemplified the expert's approach to complex problems in
general, and to community development problem solving in particu-
lar. The problem, or problems, confronting Sam's and Stella's neigh-
borhood group had all the potential for complexity or "ill-
structuredness." The goal - revitalization of a neighborhood de-
scribed as distressed - could not have been more ambiguously de-
fined: what is "revitalization?" Would we know it if we saw it?49 The
means to "revitalization" - here, the support of small businesses -
was only slightly more circumscribed. Some of the variables of the
problem may be invisible to the client, but perfectly clear to the
agency that set the problem in motion: constraints on uses of funds,
time limits, benchmarks for progress, involvement of other actors such
as other representatives of government or the business community
outside the neighborhood. Other variables may be unclear to all: the
number of entrepreneurs available and qualified for support, the sus-
tainability of funding, and (depending on the thoroughness of the pre-
liminary research) the actual market for retail products and services
within and from outside the neighborhood. There is no way to predict
whether achievement of even the major subordinate goal, that of cre-
ating small businesses, will result in neighborhood revitalization, let
alone whether any particular action taken in support of any small
businesses will guarantee their success.50
49 Whether an urban area can be said to have been "revitalized" calls upon political,
physical, and economic definitions, and absolutely depends on whether one elicits the per-
spective of the winners or the losers. For an attempt to arrive at a measurement more
precise than "I know it when I see it," see Harold L. Wolman, Coit Cook Forde III &
Edward Hill, Evaluating the Success of Urban Success Stories, 31 URB. STUDIES 835, 836-37
(1994) (comparing economic well being of residents in distressed cities perceived to have
experienced "successful" revitalization from 1980 - 1990, to that of residents in similarly
distressed cities not thought to have been revitalized). The gentrification often seen as one
indicator of revitalization creates desirable living and work space for some, and the dis-
placement of homes and cherished institutions for others. For a study defining the ele-
ments and impacts of "gentrification," see Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, Dealing
with Neighborhood Change: A Primer on Gentrification and Policy Choices, (Brookings
Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, April 2001) available athttp://
www.brookings.edu/urban. See also John W. Fountain, A Chicago Bluesman, Reaching
Crossroads, Gives Up His Fights, N.Y.TIMES, July 15, 2002, at A10 (describing the resis-
tance of Jimmy Lee Robinson, blues guitar player, to the leveling of the bars, storefronts
and restaurants on the street in Chicago where he and others had lived and played their
music for decades); Eric Siegel, Urban Revitalization - But at What Cost? BALT. SUN,
March 11, 2002, at 1A (interviewing twenty-year tenants of a subsidized apartment build-
ing for which the owner does not plan to renew the federal subsidy contracts, in the gentri-
fying southwest Baltimore neighborhood of Ridgely's Delight).
50 That policymakers often give little thought to whether the programs they prescribe
to cure certain social ills have ever been or could ever be, proven to do so, is a fixture of
social policy. For a catalogue of all the unexamined assumptions in a typical job training
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The example described earlier of the relationship between the
problem-solving architect and her client seems a good analogy - a
"source" - to that between Sam and Stella and their client's problem.
An even better analogy for Sam and Stella may be to the relationship
between the writer and her product. Within the continuum of "ill-
structuredness," the assignment to design a house stands closer to the
well-structured end; the mission of writing a novel, or even an essay
with a pre-determined topic stands close to the other. (Poem-writing,
like fugue-composing as mentioned earlier, has at least the possibility
of reference to external conventions, or "constraints," such as choice
of meter, or end-line or internal rhyming). For the architects who care
whether what they design will be comfortable and safe to live in,
within the "ISP" of house-building there are many external con-
straints, such as building codes and suitability of materials, that can be
closed' through the application of schemata. For the author, the only
constraints may be the ones which she creates. Similarly, Sam's and
Stella's community development "problem" can be seen "in the large"
to be almost completely formless. Virtually every definition of the
problem is subjective, including even the definition of who the prob-
lem solvers ought to be, and everything is potentially open to debate.
Not all problems that arise in the practice of community develop-
ment need present themselves as completely ambiguous. Some, such
as the purchase and management of a building by its tenants, though
hugely complex, resemble more closely the architect's problem, at the
more structured end of the continuum of "structuredness:" once the
participants have chosen their objective, then certain severe con-
straints, such as the availability and type of financing to keep the
building affordable, create "WSPs" that will build upon each other on
the way to achievement of the final goal. 51 These better-structured
ISPs - one could almost call them "sequenced WSPs" instead - and
Sam's and Stella's client's problem, both occur frequently in the
program for youth, see Carol Hirschon Weiss, Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Ex-
ploring Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children
and Families, at 2-3 (1995), at http://www.aspenroundtable.org/voll/weiss.htm.
51 For example, in the District of Columbia, the statute that gives tenants a right of first
purchase of their building defines steps the tenants must take (form and register a tenants'
association as a corporation) within a set time period after the owner notifies them of its
intention to sell, steps which trigger additional statutory time periods within which tenants
must make an offer and produce proof of financing. D.C. Code §42- 3404.2 et seq (2001).
The arrangements necessary to secure temporary and permanent financing to acquire, ren-
ovate and maintain affordable rental buildings have been described as "deals from hell."
C. Theodore Koebel, The Torturous Path of Nonprofit Housing Development, in SHELTER
AND SOCIETY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND POLICY FOR NONPROFIT HOUSING 219-30 (C.
Theodore Koebel ed., 1998) (presenting a case study of one "deal from hell"). But as
complicated and perilous as it may be, each effort at financing has its own knowable pa-
rameters and sequence of steps.
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course of community development practice. Rather than continue to
think of the situation facing Sam's and Stella's client as "ill-struc-
tured," one might label it, and its type of community development
problem, more accurately as "non-" or "unstructured." What is criti-
cal in community development practice is the ability to distinguish be-
tween when it serves clients best to conceptualize their problems "in
the large," or "in the small."
B. Can Equanimity Be Taught? (Or - the Equanimity of the Long
Distance Problem Solver)
As noted earlier, success in tackling ill-structured problems de-
pends on how long the problem solver can stave off an instinctive,
defensive reaction against being bombarded by variables that results
in a premature choking off of the problem space. The equanimity that
allows problem solvers to craft a problem space in the face of uncer-
tainty may be an aptitude or habit of mind; it may be a teachable skill.
Despite the importance of maintaining calm under conditions of ambi-
guity, it is a skill that law schools neglect in favor of teaching the op-
posite, namely, closing in - quickly and authoritatively - on
certainty.52
There is skepticism about whether the equanimity of the expert
problem solver can be taught, or whether a student must mark time
and work through an accretion of repeated experiences until she at-
tains some calm-conferring level of expertise. Students of what consti-
tutes "wisdom" compare, and find it similar to, the collection of
attributes that enables learners to excel in "problem-finding," the act
we have seen defined elsewhere as structuring the problem space.5 3
In addition to a baseline tolerance for ambiguity and an awareness of
their own limitations, problem finders exhibit an openness to change,
a willingness to confront irregularities or "asymmetry," a "sense of
52 For a small sample out of the many commentators who decry the emphasis in the
traditional law school curriculum on quick resort to schemata to interpret cases presented
with already severely excerpted facts-the opposite from teaching students to understand
that most problem spaces are shaped in the face of significant factual and environmental
uncertainty- see Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvel-
ous Adventure in which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL.W.L.REv.351, 356
(1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 135 (2001). One study com-
paring the impact of the professional training of students in law school, medical school, and
graduate school in psychology on students' ability to use different kind of reasoning found
that law school succeeded least well in helping students deal with "variability or uncer-
tainty in causal relationships." See Darrin R. Lehman, Richard 0. Lempert, & Richard E.
Nisbett, The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking
About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 440 (1988).
53 Arlin, supra note 44, at 230.
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taste" for important problems, and a learned instinct for finding "com-
plementarity" or congruence among seemingly isolated facts, an apti-
tude analogous to the expert's ability to surf schemata for associations
with new information.5 4 Unhappily for the novice problem solver,
these attributes are of the type that usually come with deep knowl-
edge of and comfort acting within a subject matter "domain. '55 Pro-
ponents of the "reflective judgment" model of cognition note that the
uncertainty and muddy outlook of ill-structured problems are exactly
what brings wisdom into play. They also warn that learners are un-
likely to acquire the level of wisdom that enables them to tolerate and
make decisions in the face of uncertainty - in short, the level that
assists in complex problem-solving - before they reach the age of
thirty.56
Since the longest law school class lasts for eight months, not eight
years, those of us who cannot wait for time to take its course must
place faith in those who believe that the "wisdom," or "equanimity,"
essential to coping with complex problems can be taught. In cognitive
theory, whether equanimity can be taught at all depends on whether
learners can be led to an awareness of their own learning processes, or
metacognition; and then to conscious application of different learning
strategies through which to improve their learning processes.5 7 Those
who are optimistic about the prospects of deliberate intervention to
increase metacognition in learners generally, and in problem solvers
in particular, have proposed several similar heuristics, or models, or
guides for doing so. Applying Dewey's prototype of "reflective think-
ing," Jonathan Baron has charted "five phases of thinking" which in-
structors may teach learners to apply to problem solving. These
include: The initial recognition that a problem exists; listing of possi-
ble characterizations of the problem and of solutions; "reasoning" or
search for information to refine the characterizations; and evaluation
and testing of the depictions of the problem in light of the informa-
tion.58 Others who have focused on teaching problem solving in the
law school context have proposed similar models. 59
54 Id. at 230-1.
55 Id. at 230.
56 Kitchener & Brenner, supra note 13, at 223.
57 Derry & Murphy, supra note 27, at 9.
58 Jonathan Baron, Reflective Thinking as a Goal of Education, 5 INTELLIGENCE 291,
295 (1981). For a similar sequence of steps that should guide problem solving, this from the
"creative problem-solving" school - "objective-finding," "fact-finding," "problem-finding,"
"idea-finding," "solution-finding," and "acceptance-finding," see ARTHUR B. VAN GUNDY,
CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING 64 (1987).
59 Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34
CAL.W.L.REv.375, 381 (1998) (presenting a "visual model for creative problem solving"
that consists of identifying and understanding the problem; choosing, posing and imple-
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Most ambitious among the heuristics of complex problem solving
that I have seen is that developed by Wayne Reeves. Reeves bases his
approach to problem-solving upon the premise that a thinker can only
manage complexity with the help of strategies to assimilate overloads
of factual information into knowledge,60 a process that he breaks
down into the three steps of getting access to information, filtering the
information, and transforming the information into something usa-
ble. 61 He proposes a heuristic of problem solving heuristics: that any
guide for problem solving include an outline of steps, (such as under-
standing the problem; planning, implementation, and evaluation;)
space for critical evaluation and questioning within each step; and
techniques for effectuating that evaluation and questioning.62 Such
techniques can include what others have identified as "diver-
gent"methods such as brain-storming for augmenting the supply of
options, and "convergent" techniques for systematizing and closing in
on options.63 Reeves recommends this format as one which fights off
paralysis in the face of overwhelming information, by encouraging for-
mulation and re-formulation within each step as more information en-
ters, rather than holding off any evaluation until the problem solver
reaches some unattainable stage of perfect information. 64
As we have seen, this is a framework which many guides to prob-
lem -solving follow, 65 but Reeves elaborates on it. In addition to this
framework, any heuristic of problem solving should include steps to
force an appreciation of the historical context and possible future, as
menting solutions; and analyzing the results, in sequence, with each step subject to re-
examination through values, interests, investigation and analysis of how to prevent a recur-
rence of the problem); Kimberly O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach Problem-
Solving, 4 CLINICAL L.REv. 65, 81 (1997) (expanding the phase identified elsewhere as
"solution-finding," into a sequence of investigations into the effects on others of actions
that could be taken to address the client's needs). Katherine Kruse has identified four
stages in a widely used prototype of a problem-solving heuristic: identifying the problem,
exploring solutions, developing and implementing a strategy, and revising that strategy in
the light of newly acquired information. Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can
Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client Rep-
resentation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405, 422 (2002).
60 Reeves, supra note 17, at xv.
61 Id. at 129-130.
62 Id. at 119.
63 Id. at 120. For a summary and description of "divergent" and "convergent" methods
of managing data in problem-solving, see Van Gundy, supra note 58, at 65-68; for guides to
problem-defining and idea-generating techniques such as nominal group technique, see
WILLIAM ROTH, JAMES RYDER & FRANK VOEHL, PROBLEM-SOLVING FOR RESULTS 29-34
(1996) (grouping techniques into four types, as designed to stimulate individual or group
creativity, to address problem networks or "messes," and to measure productivity in prob-
lem-solving).
64 Reeves, supra note 17, at 120-1.
65 See Kruse, supra note 59; Morton supra note 59; O'Leary, supra note 59.
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well as the current status, of the problem, a contextual understanding
that will assist the problem solver in remaining open to the likelihood
that "facts" will be fluid and that strategies will evolve. A system for
problem solving should also use metaphor and analogy to frame the
problem in familiar terms; and should incorporate "systems think-
ing,"'66 an analysis of any one of the multiple systems likely to be in
play under "environmental," "still-picture," and "motion-picture"
models. 67 Such a meta-heuristic is a tool kit designed to assist prob-
lem solvers in assimilating masses of knowledge to build their under-
standing of a field, the kind of "domain knowledge" that necessarily
eludes our students but that, as we have seen, many view as a pre-
requisite to the ability to handle complex problems.68
Reeves's own heuristic covers a number of stages. It begins with
gaining a historical understanding of the problem, its actors and their
systems. Then it moves through an analysis of the systems under the
three models; develops analogies to known problem situations; de-
signs a "blackboard," i.e., some visual representation of the systems
and then of the problem; engages in critical dialogue with third parties
(a "backboard") about initial impressions, and then abstracts conclu-
sions. 69 Throughout, the problem solver consciously evaluates and re-
arranges her current store of knowledge about the problem in light of
new data, and chooses from among the storehouse of techniques al-
luded to earlier in order to generate new paths for investigation or to
close other paths down. The heuristic seems to focus on problem-
finding, or what we have seen in the context of cognitive theory as
defining the problem space, though arguably the problem solver could
extend it to any one of the other steps in the problem solving se-
66 See Reeves, supra note 17, at 127-28 for a catalogue of the necessary elements of a
heuristic of problem solving.
67 Id. at 109-111 (citing BELA H. BANATHY, SYSTEMS DESIGN OF EDUCATION: A JOUR-
NEY To CREATE THE FUTURE (1991)). Reeves explains the "environmental model" of
systems analysis as one which distinguishes and notes the interactions between a system
and the context within which it functions; the "motion-picture" model as one which evalu-
ates a system's internal components over time; and the "still-picture" model as one which
observes the relationships among a system's components. In his example, an environmen-
tal systems analysis of a library would map all its external influences such as its funding,
external board of directors if any, vendors, and patrons. A still picture analysis would look
at its physical facility, staff, collection, and supplies. A motion picture analysis would ex-
amine the functions of its elements over time, such as circulation, acquisition, cataloguing,
reference services, personnel management, and client feedback. The environmental model
in particular reinforces the concerns expressed by Kim O'Leary in her proposal for "differ-
ence analysis," in which lawyers pay particular attention to the reciprocal impacts of the
actions of their clients and the actors in their environment. O'Leary, supra note 59.
68 Reeves, supra note 17, at 111 (describing systems' thinking as one of a number of
tools, including schema theory, and dialectical and critical thinking, to enable the learner to
gain a grasp of a domain while integrating masses of in-coming information).
69 Id. at 133-135.
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quence as prescribed by other writers. Reeves's and other problem-
solving strategies implicitly (or in Reeves's case, explicitly) incorpo-
rate both the circular cognitive theories of how problem-solvers use
schemata to help cordon off ill-structured problems into better-struc-
tured "chunks," and the linear developmental theories of how learn-
ers move through levels of ability to acknowledge and manage
ambiguous information. In its focus on acquiring an understanding of
historical context and relationships, Reeves's model shows potential
for assisting in the systematic acquisition of knowledge about the field
within which the client's problem rests, a necessary prerequisite to the
equanimity that will aid the novice problem solver in deliberate evalu-
ation of the problem.
Researchers differ over whether learners can transfer these
heuristics for problem solving strategies across different substantive
areas of expertise or domains. There is a lack of consensus about
whether one can teach "executive learning skills" such as problem-
solving successfully through "detached" training, in which instruction
focuses on the transferable learning strategy itself; or whether stu-
dents will only internalize such skills in the context of instruction in
specific subject matter, through "embedded" training.70 To give a law
school example: a "stand-alone" class in negotiation is "detached"
training (as is the typical clinic seminar segment on negotiation;) artic-
ulation of the very same lessons of negotiation in the context of a
student's representation of a client is "embedded" training. It appears
that neither approach provides any guarantees that a learner will be
able automatically to apply a learning strategy beyond the specific
context in which she is being introduced to it.71 (Without more inter-
vention, the student in the negotiation class will not necessarily show
greater facility at negotiation in her real client work than a student
who had never taken the class; and without more intervention, the
clinic student who has negotiated on behalf of a clinic client will not
necessarily extrapolate that experience to another clinic client, or to a
client outside clinic.) That transferability depends on the care which
the teacher takes in making the learning lessons explicit across the
boundaries of discrete experiences.
As Baron has noted, there are "rules that a good thinker fol-
lows," and there are "the factors that cause him to follow or not fol-
70 See Derry & Murphy, supra note 27, at 26 (describing differences between "de-
tached" and "embedded" approaches to the teaching of learning strategies); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD XXiX (2d ed
1998) (suggesting that segregating the teaching of legal ethics into a discrete course has had
the effect of marginalizing the subject).
71 Derry & Murphy, supra note 27, at 31.
Fall 2002]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
low those rules."' 72 It is up to the teacher to create environments
within which she can demonstrate to the learner that the heuristics are
being applied. Studies of how learners acquire competencies support
what many clinical teachers have blundered into: that the tripartite
structure of the class in which principles are presented - the "case
rounds" in which the students' cases can illustrate possible use of the
principles; and the "before and after" supervision meetings in which
student and supervisor may choose to plan a performance of the prin-
ciples in a case event - provides the right balance of reinforcement. 73
Whatever the theater, "planned practice" - the planned, conscious
application to real situations of the learning strategies sought to be
taught - offers the best guarantee that the learner's metacognitive
knowledge will grow.74 "Deliberate practice" is another training step
that ideally alternates with planned practice throughout a student's
instruction. Deliberate practice consists of the monitored, self-con-
scious repetition of the desired competency outside of the workaday
setting. Both planned and deliberate practice are as much responsible
for the ability to perform Liszt at Carnegie Hall, or bat .406 at Fenway
Park, as is simple genius. 75 (It helps to have both.)
The good news for novice learners about the efficacy of deliber-
ate and planned practice is that frequency and extraordinary aptitude
of performance do matter, but raising consciousness about the lessons
transferred between each practice setting matters more. A recent
study emphasizes the importance of the hospitability of the environ-
ment within which reflective learning occurs. The study compared the
speed with which several surgical teams, located in sixteen different
medical centers, mastered a new technique for open heart surgery
which required not only use of new technology but a resulting re-ad-
justment of the traditional relationships among members of cardiac
surgery teams. 76 The elements of each team - a multidisciplinary co-
72 Baron, supra note 58, at 305.
73 For a description of the relationship of classroom to case rounds, here described as
"group analysis case meeting," to supervision of students within the structure of the clinical
course, see Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision,
21 N.Y.U.REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 141-149 (1993-94).
74 Derry & Murphy, supra note 27, at 11.
75 See K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe, & Clemens Tesch-Romer, The Role of
Deliberative Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, 100 PSYCH REV. 363, 368
(1993) (citing JOHN UNDERWOOD AND TED WILLIAMS, THE SCIENCE OF HIrrING (1986)
and using the example of a hitter in batting practice to emphasize how deliberate practice
focuses on weaknesses observed in everyday performance); Richard Goldstein & Robert
McG.Thomas Jr., Ted Williams, Red Sox Slugger and Last to Hit .400, Dies at 83,
N.Y.TMES, July 6, 2002, Al, coll, (explaining how Williams's "natural" swing was as Wil-
liams himself described it the product of thousands of hours of meticulously monitored
practice); id. at B18.
76 See Amy Edmondson, Richard Bohmer & Gary Pisano, Speeding Up Team Learn-
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hort of primary and assistant surgeons, scrub nurse, anaesthesiologist,
and perfusionist (the operator of the machine that assumes the func-
tion of the heart and lungs during bypass surgery) - and the substan-
tive training in the new technique were the same. 77 What differed was
the approach of the lead surgeon to assembling, coaching and setting
up lines of communication within each team.
Of the two teams highlighted in the report of the study, one was
led by a highly credentialed surgeon hired for his expertise in the new
technique. He picked his team members based solely on seniority,
chose not to rehearse the procedure in a practice run, and did not
discuss or try to adapt the dynamics of the roles within the team to the
new techniques. Even after fifty operations, this team failed to im-
prove the speed of or its confidence in its performance. 78 In contrast,
another team, directed by a far less experienced surgeon selected for
his enthusiasm about learning the new procedure, was assembled
based on its members' corresponding enthusiasm and desire to col-
laborate. This team's leader discouraged hierarchy, encouraged dis-
cussion of performance before, during and after each procedure, and
readily admitted error. This team was among the quickest within the
study to adapt to the new procedure. 79 Researchers concluded overall
that the lead surgeon's status, the experience of the team members,
and even the use of post-operative de-briefing and reports were irrele-
vant to how quickly the team members learned. More influential
were the leader's flexibility and ability to create a safe space for non-
hierarchical discussion, evaluation and. experimentation at all phases
of the procedure. 80 Another factor that improved performance was
the maintenance of cohesion of the team over time, an approach dif-
fering from the usual treatment of surgical teams as a collection of
fungible individuals. 81
Teachers can, and do, create worlds which structure the self-con-
scious acquisition of learning strategies, and as a result hasten the usu-
ally deliberate process of building the equanimity necessary for
solving complex problems. But can students learn how to solve com-
plex problems while working on them? The optimum environment for
complex (or any) problem solving would allow for the application,
through deliberate practice and team-building, of Reeves's or any of
the problem-solving heuristics we have seen. The surgery study sug-
ing, 79 HARV. Bus. REV.5, 5-8 (Oct. 2001) (describing the new technique, the training, and
the implementation).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 8.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 9-10.
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gests that the greatest success in mastering new skills results from con-
tinuous reflection upon and adjustment of the performance of tasks,
repeated over time, (in short, deliberate practice,) in a team whose
membership is maintained constant over time. In clinical law settings,
the "team" of client, supervisor and students stays constant, at best,
over eight months. Thus the learning argument for the "small case" is
that its finiteness - such as an unemployment insurance case, involv-
ing a limited forum with bounded applicable law - may allow for the
monitored repetition of isolated skills throughout several cases within
the concededly inadequate time frame. 82
But the learning argument for the "big case" - here, the commu-
nity development case with its ambiguous actors, boundaries and
goals - is that its amorphousness allows for teaching the skill of
"problem-finding"under conditions that more closely approximate
those of real life. To accommodate the heuristics of "small case"
problem solving to projects which transcend years, in which students
address systemic issues that transcend individual cases, Katherine
Kruse suggests the strategies of "compartmentalization, connection,
collaboration and continuity:" creating manageable sub-tasks, main-
taining contact with clients who give meaning to the issues, working in
teams, and building in mechanisms to bridge the gap between genera-
tions of students who inherit the projects. 83 Kruse's "compartmental-
ization" resembles the "decomposing" or "sub-goaling" that we
discussed earlier, here the planned rather than panicked sculpting out
of a well-structured sub-problem from the larger complex one.84 As I
will discuss below, Sam's and Stella's case offers an opportunity to
adapt the compartmentalization strategy, spliced with others we have
seen, to form an explicit heuristic to instruct students in complex
problem-solving as a self-conscious, deliberative process.
C. "Who is the Client?:" An Initial Exercise in Problem-Finding
and Compartmentalization
The toughest test for a novice problem solver is to be faced with a
"done deal:" when someone else (usually in a position of perceived
superior expertise and authority) assigns a problem and characterizes
it as a well-structured one, with limited tasks and closed constraints.
82 For a summary of literature addressing the arguments supporting "big cases" or
"small cases" as vehicles for mastery, see Kruse, supra note 59, at 407-08. I have not men-
tioned the one semester, or (at best) four month clinical course, because it is difficult to see
how in such a short period of time students could benefit from any of the techniques I have
reviewed for building the metacognitive strategies critical to an appreciation of complexity
(unless they were enrolled in clinic full time).
83 Id. at 433-4.
84 See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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The received wisdom of the WSP is infinitely more difficult to chal-
lenge than the paralyzing morass of an ISP. Sam and Stella could not
possibly know that the most important unknown variables, or "open
constraints," in this problem would be the first, the ones which the
initial formulators of this problem assumed to be and presented as
"closed:" those concerning first, the identity, and then, the role, of the
client. As the identity of the community client is not only a concern
for this hypothetical problem but a perpetual question for community
development practice, I will address that constraint first.
I noted earlier that Sam's and Stella's client was an artificial
group, convened with no obvious mission or powers beyond the lim-
ited purpose of satisfying a condition for a grant. The group was pul-
led together, perhaps in haste, perhaps even with deliberation, but
with no end in mind save attainment of someone else's goal. Its artifi-
ciality may explain its instability: after its initial assembly, the client
group experienced almost complete turnover in membership over the
next few months. It would have taken a great deal of shared experi-
ence and skillful management of group dynamic to enable it to func-
tion as any kind of representative or deliberative body;85 indeed, the
initiators of the project did not seem to have contemplated such func-
tions or to envision the organization of the group for action as particu-
larly important.
"Who is the client?" is the question lawyers ask when strategies
of class action litigation mash the interests of individuals into the case
theory for the collective; 86 or when the presence of the third person in
the room (the literal physicality of an interpreter or overbearing rela-
tive, or the absent but felt presence of someone else in a position to
influence the client's decisions)8 7 puts the autonomy of the named cli-
85 See, e.g., Chris Carlson, Convening, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 185-86 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah
McKearnan, & Jennifer Thomas-Larner eds., 1999) (cautioning those who convene meet-
ings on the complexities of choosing the participants, particularly when the goal is to as-
semble those representative of key interests).
86 For a summary of issues in impact and class action litigation, pitting individual clients
against community interests, and named plaintiffs against members of the class, see Report
of the Working Group on Rendering Legal Assistance to Similarly Situated Individuals, 67
FORDHAM L.REv. 1801, 1804-06 (1999); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the
Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2450-
53 (1999) (summarizing literature addressing conflicts between representing the interests
of individuals and the broader call to social change; between represented individuals and
third parties; and among members of a class).
87 See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEXAS L.REv.
963, 968-69 (1987) (describing ethical problems posed when the lawyer must divine whose
intent to follow, and who to represent in the hypothetical of "The Unwanted Will," in
which spouses meeting together with an attorney voice approval the content of their identi-
cal individual wills, but the wife expresses reservations in a separate meeting). The litera-
Fall 20021
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW,
ent in doubt. But this is an occasional question. With the community
lawyer and a community group client, "who is the client" is a constant,
an inquiry not merely into the clarity of the client's professed goals
but into the client's very composition. The reasons for this are practi-
cal and political. Practically, it is difficult or impossible to take direc-
tion from eight or nine people at once, or perhaps a different eight or
nine people the next time. Ethics codes allow lawyers to sidestep this
challenge by relying on the decisions of the group's "duly authorized
constituents, '88 a strategy that some have noted as unsatisfying, par-
ticularly when the group is young and its processes of decision-making
are unsteady. 89 To identify who speaks for the client group, or to elicit
a "group voice"out of a tangle of discordant voices, one upon whose
authority the lawyer reasonably may take direction, can become an
endlessly involving activity. 90 A related practical consideration is
whether the client group is adequately constituted to do the work, a
question rarely broached for the individual client. Community groups
create housing, day care, small business incubators, and a host of
other services and facilities; they stand in for government and "civil
society." Their governing boards need the "capacity" to raise money,
draft mission statements and budgets, and operate facilities. 9' These
practical concerns are serious and real. But ultimately, whether the
ture is expanding on the ethical and instrumental considerations facing the community
lawyer in her representation of group clients and individual members of the client group,
and of groups in relationship to each other. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the]Road Back
In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 557, 577 (1999)
(on counseling individual clients on the impacts of their decisions on the larger client group
within a community lawyering approach); Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Mon-
olithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of Interest and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer,
67 FORDHAM L.REv. 2339, 2340 (1999) (addressing questions of positional con-
flicts-defined broadly as those involving political, legal and economic interests beyond
those put directly at issue between parties in a discrete litigation-among an attorney's cli-
ent groups).
88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.13(1998).
89 Southworth, supra note 86, at 2465.
90 See generally Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy
and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA.
L.REV. 1103 (1992) (addressing issues of intra-group dynamic and acknowledgment of in-
dividual voices in group representation); Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could:
Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 Wisc. L.
REv. 469, 477 (on the difficulty of identifying the "representative" community
organization).
91 There is an enormous literature debating the capacity of community-based organiza-
tions to take on the projects that all levels of government have handed off to them. For a
sampling, see CHRISTOPHER WALKER & MARK WERTHEIMER, COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE 1990's (Urb. Inst. Press 1998); RACHEL BRATr, LANGLEY C. KEYES, ALEX
SCHWARTZ & AvIS C. VIDAL, CONFRONTING THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: AFFORDA-
BLE HOUSING IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2d ed. 1995); Nancy Nye & Norman J. Glick-
man, Working Together: Building Capacity for Community Development, 11 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 163 (2000).
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client group is, or needs to be, representative of any one constituency
is a profoundly political question, one which will be implicated when
we look later at the issue of the client's role.
Consequently, coming on top of all the other new experiences
which the clinic student must digest, the prospect of figuring out how
to communicate with a group client may be overwhelming. While
there is help here - an immensely useful literature on group dynamic
that can help students distinguish between what may be necessary
stages in a group's development, and what instead may be substantive
problems with the representation 92 - it must be introduced deliber-
ately. In order to communicate with the group, the lawyer may be
faced with the necessity of constituting it: the ethical and tactical ques-
tions of whether the lawyer serves the group well if it acts as organizer
or even leader 93 compound the wealth of purely instrumental con-
cerns over whether the lawyer can master even the most basic tech-
niques of talking to a group at all.94 In short, the rush of impressions
and ensuing tasks that an open -minded investigation of "who is the
client?" lets in may be enough to intimidate any novice lawyer into
accepting this constraint as closed, and quickly.
The teacher's own expertise in problem-finding - and stress-
handling - has taught her that these initial stages of feeling over-
whelmed constitute a "teaching moment" and a first opportunity to
suggest to the students how they can begin to develop their own
92 For summaries, presented in social work texts, of community groups, their stages of
formation, and their activities, see Jack Rothman, Approaches to Community Intervention,
in Jack Rothman, John L. Erlich & John E. Tropman, Strategies of Community Interven-
tion 27, 29-34 (2001) (describing "local development,"social planning," and "social ac-
tion" groups and the goals and activities predominant in each). For a corresponding
typology and enumeration of the activities and dynamics characteristic of each type of
group, see STEVE BURGHARDT, THE OTHER SIDE OF ORGANIZING 149 (1982) (table asso-
ciating different processes of intra-group dynamic with different types of community
group); see also Linda Argote, Deborah Gruenfeld & Charles Naquin, Group Learning in
Organizations, in GROUPS AT WORK: THEORY AND RESEARCH 369, 371 (Marlene E. Tur-
ner ed., 2001) (summarizing four key processes through which groups function: "construc-
tion," "operations," "reconstruction," and "external relations").
93 For a summary of literature on these issues, see Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L.REv. 443, 480 (2001).
94 See supra note 63, for discussion of some of the "how to" manuals that describe
techniques for encouraging groups in brain-storming and assisting them in decision-mak-
ing. With proper attention to the issues of when or whether law students and lawyers
should use these techniques in representing their client groups, we have found that stu-
dents have benefitted from exposure to this literature. For an overview of the most widely
used methods of working in groups, see CARL M. MOORE, GROUP TECHNIQUES FOR IDEA
BUILDING (2d ed. 1994). For practical advice on assisting groups in community develop-
ment practice, see ALLEN B MOORE & RUSTY BROOKS, TRANSFORMING YOUR COMMU-
NITY: EMPOWERING FOR CHANGE (1996). For a useful summary of issues that arise for any
group attempting to use "consensus-building" as a process of decision-making, see Suss-
kind et al., Introduction, supra note 85, at 5-13.
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processes of community development problem-solving. The first step
is to encourage, not assuage, the bewilderment. Acceptance of the
initial client configuration is natural and necessary - one must start
somewhere. But students must understand that the initial configura-
tion of the client, and, indeed, all representations of the initial prob-
lem, may be temporary. Sam's and Stella's supervisor would do well
to begin their relationship as a learning team with an introduction to
the reading on cognitive models of problem-solving, to suggest that
the mind rushes to quick resolution of messy problems, and that more
deliberate construction of sub-problems can accommodate and ame-
liorate that reaction. 95 The supervisor should explain to Sam and
Stella that starting with "who's the client" is one example of construc-
tion of a sub-problem, one that she is setting forth now explicitly as an
introduction to the process of complex problem-solving,
Sam's and Stella's supervisor might even start the teaching of
problem-solving by suggesting a sub-sub problem: the "done deal"
that the pre-composed client group should be constituted as a non-
profit corporation ready to qualify for recognition of federal tax ex-
empt status. The question of entity formation illustrates how reliance
on schemata can constrict the problem space - everyone, not just
lawyers, assumes that the "501(c)(3)" designation magically confers
organizational power and a kind of cachet. While being classified as a
"public charity" has its benefits, it also triggers requirements that
structure fundraising and political expression as well as impose crush-
ing burdens of paperwork and accounting. 96 Even if the group does
not rush immediately to contort its goals and its bookkeeping to fit the
requirements for tax exemption, once it chooses to formalize its or-
ganization it must - or should - spend time on developing organiza-
tional structures that will enable it to function, a necessary but inward-
95 I would suggest Herbert Simon's article, supra note 10, as a relatively accessible
example.
96 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.§509(a)(2) (2002) (defining "'private foundation"' as an organiza-
tion that does not receive more than a third of its annual support from a range of public
sources); 26 C.F.R. §1.509(a)-3 (2002) (explaining which proportions of different kinds of
revenues will exclude an organization from the category of "private foundation" and con-
sequently include it within the rubric of the less restrictedly tax exempt "public charity");
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 557:
TAx-ExEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 23-30 (July 2001) (accessible at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf) (describing the calculation of an organization's finances
under the "support test" and other financial criteria that will establish an organization's
status as a tax exempt, publicly supported charity and not a private foundation); 26
U.S.C.§501(c)(3) (2002) (effectively prohibiting exempt organizations from engaging in po-
litical campaigns); 26 U.S.C.§501(h )(2002), 26 C.F.R.§1.501(h)-1(2002) (describing process
of electing the "expenditure test" through which public charities may engage in limited
lobbying in return for detailed accounting of expenditures related to the lobbying activity).
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looking activity. 97
In short, the common reflexive reversion to the schema of the tax
exempt, non profit corporation risks cutting off from the very begin-
ning discussion about the group's self definition and plans for long
term growth.98 Formulation of the group's composition and mission
are large, intertwined sub-problems requiring the construction of big,
fluid problem spaces to accommodate quickly changing variables. In
contrast, while choice of the group's formal legal identity does depend
on how the group constitutes itself and its mission, it can be studied as
a well-structured problem space set slightly apart, with a set of known
constraints (a circumscribed body of tax law, an initial cast of charac-
ters) and finite questions to resolve. As such, it is an ideal training
vehicle for the self-conscious application of a heuristic of complex
problem-solving.
At this early stage, the teacher's most overt intervention may be
to highlight the "501(c)(3)" designation as an open constraint mas-
querading as a closed one, and the question of entity as the first of
what may be many problems "in the small" carved out of problems
"in the large." She could suggest that Sam and Stella follow Reeves's
heuristic of examining the history of the group - its formation, its
members - as currently presented; then of using systems analysis to
describe the group's present and proposed functions, and its inner dy-
namics and relationships with other actors; and then of planning how
to gather information to build better descriptions. The students could
use brain-storming or any one of a number of "divergent" techniques
to expand their thinking about new sources for investigation. As the
new information cycles through the problem space, Sam and Stella
will test it against their initial impressions of the group, its mission and
goals. In this deliberately artificially circumscribed problem space,
they will already have amassed a stabilizing amount of "domain
knowledge" about the client and its environment. Their supervisor
will help them invoke some other detached "domain knowledge" that
97 RALPH BRODY, PROBLEM SOLVING-CONCEPTS AND METHODS FOR COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATIONS 38 (1982) (emphasizing importance of distinguishing among types of or-
ganizational objectives, one of which, the "operating" objective, defines the cohesiveness
and effectiveness of the organization's internal structure); id. at 64 (noting that group's
capacity for problem solving will be affected by the clarity of division of responsibility
among its board, directors and staff - a dynamic present in any group, but most pressingly
so in those that adopt that formal a mode of organization).
98 Andrea Seielstad raises the concern that rushing to create a formal legal organiza-
tional structure for the client group may divert energy and resources towards maintaining
the group's structure, and away from critical initial activities of building a membership base
and defining the members' concerns. See Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building as a
Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem-Solving in Clinical Legal
Education, 8 CLINICAL L.REV. 445, 460 n. 69 (2002).
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they may not immediately recognize as transferable to this situation,
such as core concepts about corporations and tax exemption gleaned
from other courses or their reading assignments for clinic class.
Equipped with this information, they will begin to assess whether the
law is a fit or a stretch. They can begin to assist the client in deciding
whether a "501(c)(3)" is what it collectively wants to be and then per-
haps move on to the more amorphous problem of what it means for
the client to be a collective.
This example suggests a likely beginning to a problem-solving
heuristic for the unstructured problems that may confront community
groups in community development. Its key elements are its deliber-
ateness and transparency: the students must know at every point that
what they are doing is implementing a model of problem solving, one
that manages complexity by temporarily defining structured problem
spaces through which the problem solver can assimilate and categorize
enough information to enable her to construct less structured problem
spaces.99 The model resembles what a problem solver might use for
any complex problem, but with a few differences: one should presume
that, until investigation shows otherwise, the identity of the client can-
not be taken as a given; and that, as I will discuss below, the role of
the client and the definition of the problem not only cannot be taken
as givens, but should be perceived as politically, and maybe even ad-
versarially, constructed.
D. Sam's and Stella's Case: Combating the Well-Structured
"Causal Story," and Holding Tight to a
Piece of the "PIE"
Sam and Stella received an extremely narrow, task-oriented as-
signment: to incorporate and secure recognition of tax exempt status
for their client group. Its variables were fixed, its outcomes were pre-
dictable. As noted above, over time they transformed the space for
the problem into something considerably broader and messier. As we
have just discussed, the threshold competency of challenging that orig-
inal formulation is a cognitive competency; it is also a political one.
The first formulation of this problem arose from the application
of a "causal story;" 1° here, a thesis about the origins of urban decay.
A causal story is a script, based like any other script on a series of
99 Ann Shalleck recommends a similar process in a different context, that of supervis-
ing students in an individual client's case: that the teacher instruct students in the skill of
coping with uncertainty by guiding them explicitly in the processes of planning and reflec-
tion that they need, not by supplying them with the discrete nibbles of factual information
that they crave. Shalleck, supra note 73, at 159-163.
100 Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL.
SC1, QTRLY 281, 282 (1989).
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schemata - a collection of mental models through which the problem
solver sorts and interprets new data. In this instance, the causal story
encompassed one political actor's pre-conception of a problem (the
deficiencies in a targeted neighborhood,) of a solution (support of
small businesses to supply the missing retail and other services,) and
of a necessary adjunct to that solution (the creation of a neighborhood
advisory group as a pre-condition to funding.) 10 1 The agency's "take"
on the capacities of the neighborhood extended to its assessment of
the capacities of its residents; hence, their circumscribed role, to be
defined for convenience' sake within form documents and creation of
a legal entity. This politically constructed limitation of vision made
for a very straightforward, well-structured problem.
Another way to define a "causal story" in terms of problem-solv-
ing would be to see it as a political constriction of the "problem
space." Sam and Stella had to contend not merely with the internal
dynamic of their client, but with combating the "causal stories" that
impute a kind of "diminished capacity" to their client group's mem-
bers, and that imply a connection between that lesser capacity and the
neighborhood conditions that - to some - necessitate urban re-
newal. To the agency that generated the grant proposal, the group's
role was perfectly well defined, a "closed constraint." Under the grant
and perhaps under the agency's expectations, the purpose of the
group was to advise and consult, not to decide and implement. The
ability to see this preconception of role as an "open constraint" was
not easy to acquire, and depended partly on whether the group could
break the mold into which the agency's pre-conceptions about the cli-
ent had cast them. This is an endeavor which was partly organiza-
tional - the group had to constitute itself as an effective vehicle for
projecting a collective point of view - and partly political - the
group had to understand and challenge the "causal story" that pre-
disposed the agency to dismiss it as a full partner.
Getting under the "causal stories" is not easy - it is difficult not
to feel the power of them. 102 There is nothing new about imputing
urban decline to poor people, and poverty to poor people's individual
101 For a generalized description of the processes of "problem-solving" and "problem-
setting," abstracted from the construction of urban renewal as a social policy in the 1950's
but resonant with the sequence of assumptions embedded in Sam's and Stella's client's
case, see Donald A. Schon, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in So-
cial Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 254, 260-63 (Andrew Ontony ed., 1979).
102 Gary Blasi has described the force in Western cultures of the "Fundamental Attribu-
tion Error," or "FAE," of assigning the cause of social problems such as homelessness to
the personal characteristics of homeless individuals. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attri-
bution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions of the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 212 (2000).
Fall 20021
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
characteristics. 10 3 Most recently, during the 1990's respected journal-
ists and researchers dismissed the capabilities of the inner cities and
explicitly of those who live within them to generate healthy environ-
ments for growth;10 4 opposing voices urged investment in cities as
much for the potential of their markets as of their residents.10 5 As
Jane Aiken has noted, one can assume the pervasiveness of oppres-
sion in law as it operates among our client communities, and thus un-
derstand the enormity of making the operation of that oppressiveness
visible.'0 6 The pervasiveness of assumptions about the incapacity of
poor people helps make legal oppression possible; and at first glance,
just as difficult to detect.
A lawyer and any client, whether an individual or a group, may
view that client's case politically or apolitically and choose to expand
or narrow the strategies to accomplish that client's goals accordingly.
What is critical is that that expansion or narrowing result from con-
scious choice. The de-politicization of the community client's agenda
is a constant threat to the client's autonomy and to its ability to act in
stewardship for its community's interests.10 7 Just as lawyers need to
pay attention to the construction of a community group client in a way
they might not worry about construction of an individual client, for
the group client they also must heed what may never arise for an indi-
103 The literature documenting the attribution of poverty to personal characteristics of
poor people is enormous, particularly in the context of demonstrating how such personal-
ization has driven welfare policy. One which I always cite, as it is among the most power-
ful, is Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 1159 (1995); see also JOEL F. HANDLER
& YEHESKEL HASFENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM
IN AMERICA (1991). For a historiography of social science theory and research on causes
of poverty, from the Progressive Era to the present, see Alice O'Connor, POVERTY
KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
U.S. HISTORY (2001).
104 For enunciation of the classic disclaimer on the validity of community development
as a strategy for urban renewal, see Nicholas Lemann, The Myth of Community Develop-
ment, N.Y.TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 9, 1994, at 27 (stating in subtitle: "Politicians like it.
Foundations like it. It sounds good to conservatives and liberals alike. But history shows
that of all possible solutions to the crisis in the ghettos, it's the one most likely to fail.");
WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 51-52 (1996) (suggesting that, in losing
their connection to the world of conventional paid work, residents of inner cities adopt and
transmit to their children by example behaviors maladaptive to working anywhere else).
105 See Michael E. Porter, Forum: New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development,
11 ECON. DEV. Q. 11, 14, 16-17 (1997) (noting that urban centers offer "a large local mar-
ket with substantial purchasing power," but also commenting that while employers dwell
on the unreliability of inner-city employees, their complaints are over-blown, and that a
productive workforce and a base of entrepreneurs are both present in inner-city
neighborhoods).
106 See Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L.REv. 287, 297 (2001).
107 Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427,
487 (2000) (singling out attention to the risks of de-politicization of disputes as one feature
of "responsible lawyering.")
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vidual client: the political question of stewardship for a community's
vision of economic justice. Not all community groups may come to
their work with the explicit mission of social change. But for the com-
munity organization set on accomplishing neighborhood development,
politicization of goals is more likely than not why that organization
has chosen development work in the first place. Founders and staff of
many community development organizations see themselves as devel-
opers of last resort, in neighborhoods long ignored by commercial de-
velopment; they see their mission as one of creating and maintaining
wealth in these abandoned communities. 10 8 Students who choose to
represent clients in a community development clinic (at least, in our
community development clinic) may do so in the hope of gaining
transactional skills that will serve them in commercial practice. But
they also enter a practice in which many of their clients will aspire to
right imbalances of economic power. Introducing students to commu-
nity development representation through this lens necessitates neither
forced "buy-in" (by them) nor imposed "cram -down" (by us) of a
particular set of political values - with these clients, they will see very
quickly that it is intrinsic to the work.10 9
Meeting the clients is often a powerful antidote to assumptions
about the intrinsic helplessness of poor people in poor communities.
Lawyers and law school clinic supervisors in community development
practice have noted in their clients a high degree of motivation and
sophistication about the community's dynamic and needs.110 This is
108 See Herbert J. Rubin, RENEWING HOPE WITHIN NEIGHBORHOODS OF DESPAIR:
THE COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT MODEL 135-37 (2000) (citing the views of staff of
a number of community development corporations).
109 For some thinking about how, or whether, to ingratiate law school clinic students
with the idea that their client representation might be part of, and that they gain strategic
insights from, a broader social justice mission, see Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting
Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 62-67 (1995) (describing how a clinic supervisor might "invite" a
student surprised at the client's insistence to fight eviction from a sub-standard apartment
to read a study on the scarcity of decent affordable housing); Barbara L. Bezdek, Legal
Theory and Practice Development at the University of Maryland: One Teacher's Experience
in Programmatic Context, 42 J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 127, 131 (1992) (explaining the im-
portance of locating the Legal Theory and Practice program in the first year of law school,
when students will be most receptive to the view that representation of poor people is an
essential part of the legal culture).
110 See William C. Kennedy, Gary F. Smith & R. Mona Tawatao, Cultural Changes and
Community Economic Development Initiatives in Legal Services: What Happened in Two
Programs, CLEARINGHOUSE REv./J. POVERTY L.& POLICY 441, 446 (Nov.-Dec. 1999) (ob-
serving that legal services attorneys switching over to a community development practice
were struck by the impression that they were dealing for the first time with "a powerful
and occasionally demanding organizational client," often with its own proactive agenda
and swiftly changing and constant demands); Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Commu-
nity Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic
Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 207, 219 (1997) (noting that community development law-
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not to say that Sam's and Stella's initial encounters with the disorgani-
zation of their pre-composed client "group" were not objectively frus-
trating. It does clients, students and lawyers no good to romanticize
clients in community development. Community clients can add to the
usual behaviors that lawyers find irritating in any individual or group
client (missing appointments, signing papers before the lawyer gets a
look at them) a whole host of new possibilities based on the complica-
tions of acting as a collectivity or entity (failing to give their members
notice of the annual meeting - or, indeed of any meetings; missing
the deadline for filing the annual or biennial corporate registration
fee). But there is something undeniably compelling about seeing first-
hand the evidence that gives the lie to the causal story that inner city
poverty arises from a complete absence of human capital.
For students and their community clients to wrest control of the
problem space from causal stories, in every arena where the causal
story predominates - in negotiations with public agencies and private
developers, in the media, in all the levels of legislative advocacy -
will demand every bit as much tenacity as asserting control of a court-
room, and probably for much longer. But the energy surge that ac-
companies the introductory meeting with a community, or any, client,
can abate with the first sparsely attended community forum. What
tools can we give students to keep them alert to how, and when, and
by whom, the problem space for community development is being
constructed?
We return to Reeves's heuristic for complex problem solving,
with its recommendation that early stages in problem-finding focus on
developing awareness of the history of the problem. Again, directed
reading can help the students frame the political as well as relational
contexts of their client's role, as that role defines their client's per-
spective and the perspectives of third parties. The influential BUILD-
ING COMMUNITIES FROM THE INSIDE OUT,1 1 1 a development manual
that questions the top-down, "deficiency-oriented" model of problem-
solving for urban communities, gives concrete examples of mapping
community assets such as churches and civic associations that students
may not have realized were strengths.112 Another tool is orientation.
We struggle with how much to "feed" our students, how much to leave
them to discover independently. What seems most valuable is an ini-
yering exposes students to poor people as influential actors in their communities).
III JOHN P. KRETZMANN & JOHN L. McKNIGHT, BUILDING COMMUNITIES FROM THE
INSIDE OUT: A PATH TOWARD FINDING AND MOBILIZING A COMMUNITY'S ASSETS (1993).
112 See id. For a recent overview, textbook style, of themes in community development,
see also GARY PAUL GREEN & ANNA HAINES, ASSET BUILDING AND COMMUNITY DEVEL-
OPMENT (2001).
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tial grounding not so much in substantive housing or consumer protec-
tion law but in the over-arching structures, who controls them, and the
history of how they got that way. A student can, and maybe even will,
look up the federal statute and regulations that dictate how public
housing authorities set rent levels for their tenants (someone may
have to tell her that the first line of inquiry is federal;) but she has no
reason, unless past experience in cooperative federalism has supplied
it, to know to look to parallel local authority; and even less reason to
understand that the tenants who pay what looks like the same per-
centage of their income for rent in another building may be doing so
under the auspices of a different agency, and subject to different rules.
An introduction to the structures and the players gives students some
grounding that they can build on.113
More subtly, we can all benefit from insights from other disci-
plines, planning in particular, to learn how to detect not so much when
as a result of a causal story our community client is being excluded
from the action, but (much more likely) how we can tell when our
client is being "played." Over thirty years ago, Frances Fox Piven
commented that federal and local development programs were begin-
ning to incorporate opportunities for citizen participation: not in order
to share control, but as a means of forestalling a repeat of the disrup-
tive demonstrations that had erupted in many cities in protest of the
violent dislocations inflicted by urban renewal. 1 4 A contemporary
observer described eight "rungs" on a "ladder of citizen participation"
in the War on Poverty's community action agencies, with the lowest
rung being the prevalent mode of sham participation, and the highest
being true managerial control by neighborhood residents over deci-
sion-making.11 5 More recently, other planners have voiced concerns
that apparent opportunities for citizen involvement in public planning
processes can be manipulated easily into token displays.1 16
113 We find that one of the quickest ways to give students this exposure, in a way that
they seem to retain it, is through requiring attendance at different kinds of community
meetings: in the District of Columbia, of the local bodies known as advisory neighborhood
commissions; of the local agencies mandated to hold public hearings on their development
plans; and of a consortium of nonprofit housing developers and community economic de-
velopment corporations.
114 Frances F. Piven, Participation of Residents in Neighborhood Community Action Pro-
grams, 11 SOCIAL WORK 73, 74 (1966).
115 Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 8 J. AMER. INST. OF PLAN-
NERS 216, 216-17 (1969) (describing the "empty ritual of participation" implemented
through the community action programs of the 1960s, and enumerating the eight "rungs"
as "nonparticipation," the stages of "manipulation and therapy;" as "tokenism," "inform-
ing, consultation, and placation;" and as "degrees of citizen power," "partnership, dele-
gated power and citizen control").
116 Kern Lowry, Peter Adler & Neal Milner, Participating the Public: Group Process,
Politics, and Planning, 16 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RESEARCH 177, 178 (1997) (expressing
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The trick is to notice when this is happening. Dana Kaminstein
conducted a study of public meetings called by the Environmental
Protection Agency in Pitman, New Jersey, in 1986, to review plans for
cleaning up a toxic waste dump. While one purpose of the meetings
was ostensibly to meet citizens' concerns, the author soon discovered
that through the hierarchical organization of the meeting room, the
framing of possible solutions, the limitation of items on the agenda,
and the use of condescending tone, the convenors suppressed any pos-
sibility of true interchange.1 17 Xavier de Souza Briggs has brought his
experience as a participant in community planning meetings to his cri-
tique of how planners inadvertently can abet the appearance, and un-
dercut the reality, of open democratic process. Noting that
contemporary planning theory and programs call for the involvement
of residents in the design of projects, he comments that planning prac-
titioners are poorly trained for how actually to conduct the meetings
which purportedly elicit the residents' input. They tend to miss all the
cues of language and personal dynamic that indicate when entrenched
interests dominate the agenda, as happened in the example from Pit-
man, New Jersey, and that rob the meeting of its inclusiveness. Briggs
emphasizes that it is desirable for a planner who wants her designs to
project the broadest range of community input - the most democrati-
cally achieved solution - to avoid identification with any one point of
view. Briggs has several suggestions for how to achieve this. One
method involves practice in the skill of "community entree," a bor-
rowing from ethnographic method. The "skill" consists of acquiring
contacts with a number of actors and agendas in the community, as a
safeguard against uninformed acceptance of one view as
predominant. 1 8
In the context of disputes resolved through litigation, the recogni-
tion that treatment previously endured as unexceptionable is in fact
intolerable has been referred to as a "perceived injurious experience"
or "PIE." 119 Here, the "PIE" may be the tokenism of a client's pres-
concern about the susceptibility of "consultative processes" to manipulation).
117 Dana S. Kaminstein, Persuasion in a Toxic Community: Rhetorical Aspects of Public
Meetings, 55 HUMAN ORG. 458, 461-62 (1996); see also Caroline S. Tauxe, Marginalizing
Public Participation in Local Planning: An Ethnographic Account, 61 J. AM. PLANNING
Ass'N 471, 474-76 (1995) (describing how fast-track, "participatory," but highly controlled
procedures by which the state of North Dakota awarded permits to corporations to build
coal gasification and other plants in rural areas in fact used sophisticated rhetorical pat-
terns to override older local customs of case-by-case land use determinations).
118 Xavier de Souza Briggs, Doing Democracy Up-Close: Culture, Power, and Communi-
cation in Community Building, 18 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RESEARCH 1, 10 (1998).
119 See William L.F.Felstiner, Richard L.Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L.& Soc'y. REV. 631, 633
(1980-81).
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ence on a task force, or the imposition of someone else's "schema"
constructed from past experience and causal stories about the proper
role for grassroots involvement in community planning. Lawyers, and
law students, are not ethnographers. But acquisition of the skill of
"community entree" can assist them in distinguishing between mock-
eries of community participation that only drain energy and waste
time, and processes that genuinely elicit the clients' real collaboration
- in short, in alerting their clients to the possibility that the very nar-
rowness of the problem space in which they are encompassed is a
"PIE."
A cautionary note is necessary here. Just as earlier I alluded to
- and dismissed - the possibilities of "cram-down" in alerting stu-
dents to political and structural aspects of the problem space, one
must at least acknowledge that one's own "schemata" can suggest
harm to clients and students injuries where none exists. An exper-
ienced community development lawyer is just as susceptible to seeing
a "PIE" lurking (a strange image to be sure) 20 behind every overture
to collaborate in a community-wide project, as an experienced te-
nants' lawyer can see in every action for eviction an affirmative de-
fense for conditions. This is in fact where the senior lawyer's, or
clinical supervisor's, own skill at "morphing" comes in, at least the
part of that skill that allows for judgment to dictate when to apply and
when to refrain from reaching for the schemata that alert her to harm-
ful possibilities: in Sam's and Stella's case, when someone else's fram-
ing of a problem may be detrimental to a client's interests. A
supervisor can provide immeasurably constructive support to her stu-
dents, without divesting them of the degree of autonomy necessary to
their learning, by suggesting this framing; 121 but also by discussing
with her students how her own experiences have led her to it, and how
sophisticated problem-solving demands dissection of what evoked the
particular schema, and of whether this situation calls for its
application.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY
PROBLEM SOLVING
As we have seen, proponents of heuristics in problem solving
seem to concur that the ultimate value of any heuristic lies in its user's
120 The acronym creates an unfortunate mixed metaphor, for which I apologize.
121 Jane Aiken has described the kind of careful questioning that can elicit realization
from a student of how she has inadvertently constructed and worked from a "causal as-
sumption" about her client and thus about her client's problem. This is a process that can
assist a student in reflecting upon her decision-making, without taking her decision-making
away from her. Aiken, supra note 106, at 301-02.
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ability to reflect upon it, to rise above the process and understand how
these steps have contributed to her development of a strategy for
learning. That prescription calls for the talents of a supervisor who
can practice a judicious combination of the "directive" and the "re-
flective." "Directiveness," if defined as intervention to assist in sup-
plying a problem solving model and in defining a trajectory of linked
problem spaces, has its place in clinics that deal repeatedly with ill-
structured or unstructured problems. Clinical supervisors in clinics
that focus on litigation can be "non-directive" in part because the
presence of a tribunal, with its timetables and rules, provides closed
constraints that allow treatment of even extremely complex situations
as sequenced well-structured problems. That grounding in one well-
structured problem space allows students the freedom to develop less
structured, more flexible spaces in other fora. Focusing on an individ-
ual client, with a definable locus of information and - presumably -
a finite universe of problems, also limits the number of variables and
enables students to keep their problem spaces manageable.1 22
The "directiveness" of many supervisors in community develop-
ment clinics consists of supplying the frames that in other clinics come
ready-made with the tribunal. When supervising attorneys offer their
clinic students suggestions for gaining context - readings, interviews,
field trips - they are revealing meta-frames of history, networks, and
hierarchies that little else can provide. These are steps towards fram-
ing that the students might (and sometimes do) discover on their own.
But that discovery might take months, and represents only the minut-
est initial step towards defining the problem space. It takes almost
nothing away from the students for the supervisor to extend her ex-
pertise to give that much background, and thus to allow the students
to infer dimensions of a possible problem space or spaces. When su-
pervising attorneys suggest to their students that they should pause
before they act on their first impulse to frame a formless problem, or
even before they follow what seems to be a proven path to resolution
of a more structured one, then they are extending something truly val-
uable: not just their schemata about the politics of affordable housing
or the history of redlining, but their own "schema knowledge," their
sense of how to approach the ill-structured problem.
That's what the fly does when she comes down off the wall - and
not just from May to December.
122 See Kruse, supra note 59, at 424-429 (describing how the stages in a four- step prob-
lem-solving heuristic work in the context of addressing the problems of individual clients).
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